i. Special Response Corporation helps minimize costly disruptions to your business that may result from a labor dispute. We have a proven reputation for excellence in the industry, gained during 25 years of experience meeting the labor crisis security needs of over 2,000 clients in the United States and Canada.

Special Response Corporation teams and/or TeamWorks USA, Inc personnel may be deployed to your location with 24 hours notice or less. Our security professionals are employees of Special Response Corporation, on stand by status, awaiting deployment.

Our teams consist of professional, disciplined and highly trained security personnel with extensive law enforcement or military experience, trained to meet your security needs. Labor Dispute/Strike Security Services offered include:

Pre-Strike Services Offered
  Security Plan
On-site training
Security Guard Training
Seminars for Management

Strike Security Services Offered
  Secure Transportation
Material Delivery
Executive Protection Services
Shuttle/Transfer Services
Housing and/or Food Support Services
Temporary/Replacement Workers
Advanced Technology

We have worked with clients in such industries as: aggregate, utility, energy, paper, manufacturing, distribution, warehousing, chemical, hospitality, grocery/retail, entertainment, media, healthcare, construction, pharmaceutical, waste haulers, telecommunications, defense contractors, and transportation.

A. Protecting one's information against the threat of technical interception, or eavesdropping, is complicated by the variety of techniques, which an eavesdropper has at his disposal. If he is determined to intercept the information, he may employ any or all combinations of threat techniques. The level of his determination will be influenced by the value of information (to him).
B. The problems presented by the area in which the eavesdropper must operate will also influence the choice of threat techniques. Those items that limit the techniques at his disposal include the physical standards and safeguards in the target area, his own capabilities and his access to specialists that can broaden his capabilities.
C. In evaluating the technical interception threat, several questions must be answered.

1. What is the value of information to the potential eavesdropper?
This value, which may be completely different from its value to the owner of the information, tends to establish the threat level (the extent and expense to which the eavesdropper will go to gain the information). It also establishes, to some extent, the risk he will take to acquire the information. Obviously, if the information is of relatively low value, the eavesdropper will expend relatively little time and money and expose him/herself to very little risk.
2. Who constitutes the threat?
This question is best answered by determining who can benefit from the interception. Depending on who and what benefit can be determined, there is some basis for an analysis of technical capability and probability that specialist will be employed.
3. What is the desired duration of the interception?
If the duration is short, (a two hour conference for example) some interception techniques are more convenient and likely to be used more than others. If the desired duration is an extended one (such as continuous monitoring of an office), techniques requiring batteries in the target area are more likely to be used.
4. What other operational constraints are imposed on the eavesdropper?

In answering this question, one must realize that the eavesdropper requires three successful links to accomplish his purpose.
He must have a concealable means of conveying the physical energy of the conversation to a medium, which can be transmitted.
He must have a concealable means of transmitting (wire, light beam, radio, etc.)
He must have a location and the terminating equipment necessary to transform the transmitted data back to a form, which can be used.

If any one of these three links are detected or prevented, the eavesdropper has failed.
D. Answering questions 1 through 3 may be relatively easy. The answer to question 4 normally requires expert evaluation of the specific problem area, if the evaluation is to be accomplished in-depth. However, consideration of the data derived from the above questions will allow the non-specialist to make at least general threat evaluations.
1. Set aside a room solely for the use of negotiating officials when discussing any aspect of the negotiations. Ideally, this room would be at the end of a corridor, above ground level or in a basement area. (Rooms or suites within a hotel can be adapted for this purpose.) Walls should be solid concrete block and extend from the true ceiling to the floor. If the room has connecting doors, both rooms should be designated as secure areas and controlled accordingly. If rooms with solid walls cannot be acquired, plans for controlling adjoining rooms should be made.
2. Examine the room(s) prior to initial use to insure there are no security weaknesses (speakers, vents, false walls, etc…) of listening devices, which would compromise your position. A physical and electronic examination of the room(s) may be required on a recurring basis during negotiations.
3. Secure the room prior to the examination and maintain the security posture during the entire period of negotiations. The other use of security disciplines should be put in effect through the use of: joint use security systems/security personnel, utilizing corporate personnel, off duty police officers or private security personnel. Insure that security personnel are not sympathetic to the opposing party. Change the lock(s), utilizing outside locksmith services, if practical. Institute a mandatory key control and access codes.
4. Thoroughly examine everything located within the room(s) to insure they contain no surreptitious listing devices. Thoroughly examine any items introduced after the initial examination to include food trays, plants, carts, electronic equipment, furniture, etc. Remove all intercom equipment. Provide for secure voice and fax communications.
5. Do not utilize telephones (standard, cellular or cordless types) to discuss any aspect of the negotiations unless secured or absolutely necessary. (Telephone equipment rooms, equipment, wiring, instruments, etc., are generally accessible to any number of persons who may be sympathetic to the opposition).
6. Establish a separate room for negotiations with your opponents to prevent the introduction of listening devices. Under no circumstances should your opponents be allowed into your designated secure room(s).
7. Do not discuss any aspect of your established position outside the secure room(s). Negotiators should be made aware that anything said outside the room is subject to being compromised through a number of seemingly harmless methods.
8. Provide a CROSSCUT SHREDDER for the destruction of ALL trash generated as a result of negotiations or discussions. Protect all documents generated as a result of discussion by storing in lockable containers.
9. Remove and store one time (disposable) typewriter ribbons when not in use. Destroy by cutting or shredding.
10. If negotiations continue over a protracted period of time, repeat examinations should be performed.
11. All information/documents should be saved to disk, and removed from computer hard drives. Disks should be secured, and also have password protection.
12. If possible, rotate the pre-registration meetings off-site. Do not announce the location until 1 hour prior to the meeting.

The announcement of a plant closure or large-scale downsizing presents a security challenge for corporations as the threat of employees retaliation looms. During such times, companies are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and acts of workplace violence.

Special Response Corporation will work with your organization to develop a contingency plan addressing your company’s specific needs. Our consulting services include an on-site assessment conducted by top level security professionals detailing your company’s security needs, including:

  Perimeter protection
Access control
Video surveillance
Intrusion detection
Threat mitigation systems
Infrastructure design for data distribution and telecommunications

A plant closing or a personnel downsizing of a facility can be very stressful for the displaced worker. The loss of income and/or ones ability to find desirable replacement employment can be very traumatic to certain individuals. Corporations can reduce these conditions by being prepared prior to the plant closing or downsizing announcement with assistance and guidance. It is now mandatory to notify employees of a plant closing or a downsizing 60 days before the actual event. In many cases we are dealing with stress or even depression connected with the loss of a job. It is important that the corporation immediately provide the assistance needed after the announcement. The sixty day notice is an adequate amount of time if used wisely; however, the employers should do the following:

Work with union representation as early as possible and coordinate with their efforts. x
Work with union representation as early as possible and coordinate with their efforts.
Have a Human Resources Specialist or a professional available in order to coordinate the efforts of the employee.
Have your Human Resources supervision and/or staffs explain to each employee individually the rights and benefits that are available to them.
Canvass the local job market for similar jobs available in the community for possible placement.
Invite and/or provide Placement Training Experts to teach the latest techniques in resume writing, cover letters and interviewing.
Post any positions available at other locations in the same organization.
Notify the State and Federal agencies that deal with unemployment and have them possibly visit the facility and brief the workers on collecting unemployment income, retraining, social security and other opportunities available with their agencies.
Have counseling available for those individuals desiring help with the stress.